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 Executive Summary 
Many view the Department of Defense’s (DoD) acquisition process as ripe for 
repair. Some of the signs illustrating this need can be found in cost overruns, late 
deliveries and unfulfilled expectations. In the past, the acquisition process 
predominantly used the Block approach or Pre-planned Product Improvement (P3I) 
to fulfill system requirements. Both these processes require the upfront knowledge of 
the end-product and any possible upgrades. Therefore, either the final capability 
took a long time to deliver, or the product had to be fielded before it was ready and 
tested. Frequently, during the long lead-times of development, production, and 
testing, the end-users’ needs changed and/or technology improved. The change in 
requirements prompted alterations of strategy. These were then formulated in 
response to the changing face of war by Pentagon managers. The new strategies 
then invariably led to more upgrades or more modifications. Advancing technology 
also necessitated improvements. The diversity and complexity of these intermittently 
overhauled systems resulted in lower operational availability. One example is the 
current status of the Phalanx Close-in Weapon System (CIWS); this system 
encompasses 158 ships, 308 mounts, and 6 different baselines. The different 
baselines for all these mounts necessitate increases in logistics complexity. The 
need for appropriate spare parts and expertise adds burden to inventory 
management—increasing lifecycle cost and reducing operational availability. A 
possible solution to this problem is a new approach in Evolutionary Acquisition 
strategy: a process called spiral development (SD).   
Spiral development is an integral part of an overall plan of Evolutionary 
Acquisition. Unlike P3I, spiral development is a flexible process that can be adjusted 
for the changing needs of warfighters and rapid innovations in technology. The 
evolutionary abilities are, unlike in the block approach, in incremental changes. A 
“spiral” is a set of acquisition activities that are incrementally incorporated into an 
evolving baseline. Each increment builds on the previous spiral, increases the 
capability of the product, and is completed at a rapid pace. This successive and 
=
ix=
 recursive set-up helps Program Managers control the risk of developing a product 
that may not meet user specifications. Lessons learned from the previous spiral help 
managers reduce the uncertainty of the outcome of the next spiral. Therefore, the 
flexibility of the process of spiral development allows managers to adapt system 
developments to meet the evolving needs of warfighters and keep pace with 
innovations in technology. 
This research study focuses on the process, promise, and limitations of spiral 
acquisition/development. The researcher describes the process using a simple 
model. This discussion is centered on the key issues that distinguish a spiral 
approach from the traditional approaches implemented by the DoD. This study 
describes the fundamentals of the process of spiral acquisition: increments, 
characteristics of the increments, and the capabilities they deliver. The interest of 
this research is in understanding the concept of spiral acquisition as it applies 
specifically to Program Managers. The researcher illustrates this by a simple model 
incorporating successive spirals with their respective capabilities and the 
corresponding projects that deliver them. A fully comprehensive decision model that 
describes the optimal policy of whether or not to employ spiral acquisition in the 
public sector is beyond the scope of the current study. However, this research 
attempts to provide a template for that future model by expressing a set of rules that 
will help Program Managers articulate what it means to acquire a product or an 
upgrade using spiral processes. This study does not claim that spiral development is 
appropriate for every acquisition.  
A common consequence of a spiral approach may be an increase in the 
diversity of parts and, hence, logistics complexity. Therefore, an extension of this 
research would be to explore the role of modularity in spiral acquisition. The purpose 
of the future component of this study is to understand if combining modular product 
designs will help the DoD reduce logistics complexity and lifecycle cost for systems 
such as CIWS and the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS). The hypothesis is that 
modularity may bring rapid sequential innovations to the warfront—thereby avoiding 
both an obsolescence of technology and an increase in logistic complexity. 
=
x=
 In conclusion, the analysis so far suggests two key issues, the necessity for a 
template or a set of rules that will aid Program Managers in understanding and 
implementing the concept of spiral development, and the role of modularity in spiral 
development. This research plans to address these issues and provide a possible 
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 I. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
In many observers’ perspectives, the acquisition strategy of the Department 
of Defense is ripe for repair. Many consider the acquisition system broken. These 
observers note, for instance, that many acquisitions have produced huge cost 
overruns, late deliveries and unfulfilled expectations. The causes for these problems 
are numerous. Various reports written about acquisition (including a research study 
done by this researcher in the past regarding the Phalanx Close-in Weapon System) 
unveil many reasons for this seemingly unsatisfactory condition. Some such issues 
include: miscommunications about the final product desired, unrealistic expectations 
on the part of the warfighters, ever-changing budgets, occasionally inefficient 
production processes, and, finally, the logistic support needs created by multiple 
configurations. Regardless of the particular reasons, the traditional block approach 
used causes low operational availability and involves long lead time. Such long lead 
time catalyzes the fear of obsolesce of technology. All of the above are proof enough 
for some that the current acquisition system is inadequate.  This suggests that the 
processes used to execute acquisition programs in the DoD need rethinking. 
1.2 Literature Survey 
Literature on Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development, though not 
abundant, is adequate. The literature reviewed for this discussion can be divided into 
three groups. One is defense-related literature on spiral development; the next 
concerns a few applications of spiral development in the immediate past and 
possible future, and the third focuses on modularity in product design.  
Most of the literature in the first group describes the background of and the 
need for Evolutionary Acquisition and explains the structure of spiral development by 
illustrations and technical as well as practical definitions. These articles also point 
out the pros and cons of spiral development. A large portion of the literature 
surveyed falls in the first group. For instance, Johnson and Johnson, in an overview 
1=
 of spiral development, describe “The Promise and Perils” of the strategy well.1  In 
this text, we also learn one of the spiral success stories in regards to the Global 
Hawk transformation program. In another article, we learn one of the very first 
definition and characterization of spiral given by Boehm in 1988. Likewise, an 
enumeration of a set of invariant properties that the processes categorized as spiral 
must exhibit is well documented in a string of articles by Boehm.2  On a different 
note, however, the overall technical “know how” of Evolutionary Acquisition and the 
comparison of spiral development with more traditional approaches are available (as 
explanation of the software lifecycle management methodologies) in Rendon’s 
texts.3  
To clear up confusion about Evolutionary Acquisition strategies and the spiral 
development process, the Under Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum 
defining these processes in April 2002. Numerous documents quote the directive 
and add explanation.4 Likewise, new acquisition policy notes provide information on 
what has changed and why.5  In addition, the Army Knowledge Online Program 
describes how it upgraded the online portal using spiral development.6 As per the 
economic aspects of spiral, the general consensus so far (from the spiral supporters) 
is that spiral development beats spiraling costs.7 It is important to note, in the midst 
                                            
1 Wayne M. Johnson, Col USAF (Ret), and Carl O. Johnson, ”The Promise and Perils of spiral 
development: A Practical Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition,” Acquisition Review Quarterly 
(Summer 2002): 175-189. 
2 Barry Boehm, “Spiral development: Experience, Principles, and Refinements,” ed. Wilfred J. Hansen 
(Special Report CMU/SEI-00-SR-08, ESC-SR-00-08. June 2000), 1–37. 
3 Rene Rendon, ”Evolutionary Acquisition,” Teaching Notes (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, January 2005); Rene Rendon, ”Software Lifecycle Management Methodologies,” Teaching 
Notes (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 2005). 
4 Skip Hawthorne, and Ramona Lush, ”Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development,” Crosstalk 
(August 2002); Available from http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2002/08/easd.html; accessed 6 
October 2004. 
5 ”New Acquisition Policy,” Defense Acquisition University (DoDD 5000.1, DoDI 5000.2, May 2003). 
6 Jacob Jackson, ”AKO Undergoes spiral development,” Available from www.gcn.com/cgi-
bin/im.display.printable?client.id=gcndaily2&story.id=25408; accessed 6 October 2004. 
7 David F Carr, “Spiral development Beats spiraling Costs,” Baseline (April 2002); Available from 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_zdbln/is_200204/ai_ziff25152; Accessed 6 October 2004. 
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 of all of the above material regarding the spiral strategy, most valuable insights 
included in this research regarding the innovations about spiral came from a 
conversation with a senior Air Force official.8  
In addition to the theoretical definitions and descriptions of spiral, there is 
some documentation available regarding the implementation of the development 
strategy. In the discussion about the lifecycle costs of the Phalanx weapon system, 
the researcher noted the importance of spiral development.9 All the literature 
surveyed (especially in the first group) highlights the value of spiral; but the 
applications are described well in Wieringa 10 and Johnson and Johnson11.  
Specifically, Wieringa describes parallels from the past in spiral development as 
applied to the F/A-18A strike fighter with particular attention to the aircraft’s F 
variants. As mentioned above, spiral development as applied to the Global Hawk 
unmanned air system is documented with diagrams in Johnson and Johnson.  
Yet, conversely, there have been several opposing views against spiral 
expressed in the media. The high cost of DD(X), “the ship that is sinking the Navy,”12 
or the criticism of Evolutionary Acquisition as “faith-based”13 are just some examples. 
Though the critics of the Navy and spiral development feel the Navy does not have 
what it takes to expedite ship-building and deliver what is essential for defense, the 
future plans for Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)14 support the implementation of spiral 
                                            
8 Lorna Estep, Deputy Director, Supply Management, Air Force Material Command, interview by 
Aruna Apte, March 2005. 
9 Aruna Apte, “Optimizing Phalanx Weapon System Life-Cycle Support” (Acquisition Research 
Sponsored Report Series, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, October 2004), 1–33. 
10 Jeffrey Wieringa, RAD. (Sel), ”Spiral development and the F/A-18,” Program Manager (May-June 
2003): 50–53.  
11 Wayne M. Johnson, Col USAF (Ret), and Carl O. Johnson, ”The Promise and Perils of spiral 
development: A Practical Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition,” Acquisition Review Quarterly 
(Summer 2002): 175–189. 
12 ”The Ship That’s Sinking the Navy,” Editorial, The New York Times, 23 April 2005, A12. 
13 ”The Faith-Based Missile Shield,” Editorial, The New York Times, 10 October 2004,  A10. 
14 Henry C. Mustin, Vice Admiral US Navy (Ret), and Vice Admiral Douglas J. Katz, US Navy (Ret), 
”All Ahead Flank for LCS,” Proceedings (The Naval Institute, February 2003). Available from 
http://www.military.com/Content/MoreContent1?file=NI_LCS_0203; accessed 28 March 2005. 
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 development.  These two opposing viewpoints form the second group of the 
literature reviewed. 
The hypothesis in this paper, modularization needs to be an integral part of 
spiral development, was based on the research studies conducted by academia in 
the private sector. These studies form the third group of the literature reviewed. 
Krishan and Ramchandran, for example, analyze how to manage introduction of 
rapidly improving technology in product design. They combine product design and 
pricing to manage rapid sequential innovation.15 One model in the automotive 
industry analyzes component-sharing when product variety exists in many 
industries.16  Likewise, one research group’s use of a lexicographic rule in choice 
inference and formulation of a linear utility function based on that result was inspiring 
for the model discussed in this research study.17  In another study, Mikkola and 
Gassmann explain the link between modularization and open architecture.18  This 
same study also describes a model used to illustrate managing innovation through 
modular product architecture. Interestingly, the mathematical model of analyzing the 
degree of modularity in a given product in architecture forms a valuable thread 
amongst all these articles. On another note, an article by Desai and others talks 
about the economic aspect of modularization.19
All the literature reviewed addresses certain aspects of Evolutionary 
Acquisition and spiral development. The researcher especially realized the 
                                            
15 Vish Krishan, and Karthik Ramchandran, “Combining Product Design and Pricing to Manage Rapid 
Sequential Innovation” (Working Paper, Austin, TX: University of Texas at Austin, October 2004). 
16 Marshall Fisher, Kamalini Ramdas, and Karl Ulrich, ”Component Sharing in the Management of 
Product Variety: A Study of Automotive Braking System,” Management Science 45, no. 3 (March 
1999): 297-315. 
17 Eli Dahan and others, ”Table-Stakes: Non-compensatory Consideration-then-Choice Inference” 
(Working Paper, Los Angeles, CA: UCLA, February 2004). 
18 Juliana Hsuan Mikkola, and Oliver Gassman, ”Managing Modularity of Product Architectures: 
Toward an Integrated Theory,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 50, no. 2 (May 2003): 
204-218. 
19 Preyas Desai, Sundar Kekre, Suresh Radhakrishnan, and Kannan Srinivasan, ”Product 
Differentiation and Commonality in Design: Balancing Revenue and Cost Drivers,” Management 
Science 47, no. 1 (January 2001): 37-51. 
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 importance of spiral development after analyzing the Phalanx Weapon System and 
its lifecycle cost. A comprehensive study that examines all aspects of the new 
approach was needed.  The goal of this research is to understand spiral 
development, model it into a template to be used by Program Managers and try to 
answer some of the questions raised by the Acquisition Research community.   
1.3 Motivation 
In the past, DoD Acquisition strategies predominantly used the Block 
approach or Pre-planned Product Improvement, P3I. Both the processes require the 
upfront knowledge of the end product or the potential upgrades. Therefore, either the 
time until delivery of final capability was too long, or the fielding of the product was 
premature. Frequently, during the long lead times of development, production, and 
testing, the needs of the users changed. The change in requirements prompted 
alterations of strategy. These were then formulated in response to the changing face 
of war by Pentagon managers. The new strategies then invariably led to more 
upgrades or more modifications. The diversity and complexity of these intermittently 
overhauled systems resulted in lower operational availability (Ao). For example, at 
present there exists a weapon system with 158 ships, 308 mounts, and 6 different 
baselines. The different baselines for all these mounts necessitate an increase in the 
complexity of logistics. The need for appropriate spare parts and expertise adds 
burden to the inventory management, increasing the lifecycle cost and reducing the 
operational availability of the system. All these reasons lead to partial or full-blown 
failures. Under such circumstances, the experts from the DoD (as well as from non-
DoD sources) attempt to fix the system. One such possible solution to this problem 
is perceived to be the new directive for acquisition: a process called spiral 
development, an evolutionary approach for acquisition classified as one method of 
Evolutionary Acquisition.   
1.4 Focus of the Research 
In this research, the researcher studies spiral development. Some of the 
questions raised and answered are: What is the difference between spiral and 
5=
 Evolutionary Development? How is spiral different from the Block approach and P3I? 
When should spiral development be implemented? Is this the magic tool from the 
acquisition toolbox that will cure all that is ailing the Acquisition system? How will 
spiral development affect project management and Program Managers?  This 
research study focuses on the process, promise, and limitations of spiral 
development. It is centered on the key issues that distinguish the spiral approach 
from the traditional approaches implemented by the DoD so far.  
1.5 Scope, Methodology, and Limitations 
This research studies the fundamentals of the process of spiral development 
by analyzing the spiral increments of this acquisition method, characteristics of the 
increments, and the capabilities they deliver. The interest in this research is in 
understanding the concept of spiral development as it applies, specifically, to 
Program Managers (PM). The researcher illustrates this by creating a simple model 
incorporating successive spirals with their respective capabilities and the 
corresponding projects that deliver them. A fully comprehensive decision model that 
describes the optimal policy of whether or not to employ spiral development in the 
public sector is beyond the scope of the current study. However, this research 
attempts to provide a template by expressing a set of rules that will help the PM 
articulate what it means to acquire a product or an upgrade using the spiral process. 
This study does not claim that spiral development is appropriate for every 
acquisition.  
This research, just like the topic it studies, is a work in progress. Analysis so 
far suggests two key issues: the necessity of a template or a set of rules to 
standardize the eluding concept of spiral development that will aid Program 
Managers and the necessity for those Program Managers to understand the role of 
modularity in spiral development. This research plans to address these issues and 
provide a possible road map to navigate through them. In order to achieve this goal, 
this paper will look at lessons learned by private-sector industries and private-sector 
practices that could be applicable in the public sector. It will also identify issues that 
need further study. For example, a common consequence of spiral development 
6=
 may be an increase in diversity of parts and, hence, logistics complexity. Therefore, 
an extension of this research explores the role of modularity in spiral development. 
Economies of scale are an important benefit of modularity. The interest in the latter 
part of this study is to understand if combining modular product design will help the 
DoD reduce logistics complexity and lifecycle cost for systems such as CIWS and 
LCS. The hypothesis is that modularity may bring rapid sequential innovations to the 
war front, thereby avoiding obsolescence of technology, decreasing logistic 
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 II. Spiral: A Perspective 
2.1 Spiral, Block, and P3I Approach 
Two forms of Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy that can be implemented are 
the traditional Incremental Development and spiral development. Both strategies are 
incremental approaches. Incremental Development approaches used in the past, 
such as the Block approach, had larger increments than the increments used in the 
current approach of spiral development. The traditional approach may have several 
pieces of an integrated system that must be fielded at the same time. In Block 
Development (one example of an Incremental Approach), a desired capability is 
identified, and the end-state is known. This requirement is met over time by a 
contractor developing several increments. These increments are subject to the 
availability of mature technology. However, in spiral development, a desired 
capability is identified, but the end-state requirements are not known at program 
initiation. Requirements are refined through demonstration and risk management. 
There is continuous user feedback, and each increment in spiral development (SD) 
provides the user the best possible capability.  
Every Incremental Development process results in a militarily useful and 
supportable operational capability that can be developed, produced or acquired, 
deployed and sustained. A traditional Block approach involves fielding a revamped, 
upgraded capability. These developments may require a long lead time, and the 
desired end-state of the entire development is usually agreed upon. A Pre-planned 
Product (P3I) Improvement approach is an approach where the developer knows 
upfront what the entire development will look like. P3I provides for adding improved 
capability to a mature system. Thus, both the Block and P3I approaches establish a 
core capability with additional increments of functionality added over time where the 
functionality of all blocks is defined upfront. Here the increments can be substantial 
in length of time and capability whereas in SD, these increments are much smaller. 
The traditional Incremental Development assumes the knowledge of end capability 
and may be a new product from or improvement of an old system. SD does not 
9=
 require complete knowledge of the end capability but understanding of such is 
sufficient. During the Cold-War era, the warfighter’s environment was better 
known—hence, strategies used were well established. The defense system was 
comparatively stable. In the current war against terror, the face of war and the 
mechanisms necessary to fight it effectively are ever-changing. While the Block or 
P3I approach works in the stable system, spiral development, this researcher 
believes, is the solution for dynamic systems.  
The process of spiral development is part of the overall plan of moving 
towards Evolutionary Acquisition. Unlike P3I, spiral development is a flexible process 
that can be adjusted for the changing needs of the warfighters and rapid innovations 
in technology. What is evolutionary about it is that, unlike in the Block approach, 
there are small incremental changes in spiral acquisition. Table 1 lists some of the 
differences between the Block approach and the spiral approach.  
Table 1. Differences between the Block and Spiral Approaches 
Spiral Block 
1. May involve developments that do 
not support the end goal 
Begin in previous spiral but actual 
improvements in next spiral 
1. Upfront knowledge of all upgrades  
2. Involves Rapid Increments 2. May take longer but get the final 
capability to user  
3. Have idea about the end product 3. Usually have full knowledge of the 
end product 
4. In implementation, may have to 
bring aircraft or ship to depot more 
than once 
4. Once fielded, does not usually 
have to return to depot  




 2.2 What is Spiral? 
Spiral development is a set of acquisition activities that are incorporated in an 
evolving baseline using increments. Each increment increases the capability of the 
product. Each increment is completed at a rapid pace. Each increment builds over 
each previous spiral. This successive and recursive set-up helps Program Managers 
manage the risk of developing a product that may not meet the user specifications. 
Lessons learned from the previous spiral help reduce the uncertainty of the outcome 
of the next spiral. The flexibility of the process of spiral development is one of the 
keystones of this approach. Flexibility is essential to meet the evolving needs of the 
warfighters and to exploit innovations in technology. Spiral development is an 
organized project plan intended to eliminate major risks as early in the game as 
possible. Therefore, each increment includes a reassessment of risks and 
assumptions. Each increment also creates a functioning prototype, at the end of 
which lessons learned are evaluated. Before starting the next increment, a decision 
is made about whether to proceed or not. 
The publication of the latest revisions of DoD directives 5000.1 and 5000.2 
established a preference for the use of Evolutionary Acquisition Strategies relying on 
a spiral development process. Evolutionary Acquisition, therefore, is a strategy or an 
approach to acquisition; spiral development is one of the processes that implement 
this strategy. It is believed that evolutionary methods will provide the best means of 
getting advance technologies to the warfighter quickly while continually improving 
particular systems’ capabilities. Evolutionary Acquisition, the strategy, and spiral 
development, the process, are focused on providing the warfighter with an initial 
capability (that may not be the final capability) as a tradeoff for earlier delivery, 
flexibility, affordability, and risk reduction. The capabilities delivered are provided 
over a shorter period of time—followed by subsequent increments of capability over 
time—that incorporate the latest technology and flexibility to reach the full capability 
of the system. Each increment delivers capability that meets the threshold set by the 
user for that increment. However, the first increment may deliver only 60-80% of the 
desired final capability. 
11=
 Spiral, as defined earlier, is part of an overall plan to alter the acquisition 
process. The AF Instruction 63-123 for Command and Control Systems in the Air 
Force states, “the spiral development process is an iterative set of sub-processes 
that may include: establishing performance objectives; design; code, fabricate, and 
integrate; experiment; test; assess operational utility; make tradeoffs; and deliver.”20  
2.3 Model for Spiral 
Based on the various definitions of spiral development, the process can now 
be formalized in a mathematical model. To describe the model, an introduction to the 
notation is necessary. 
Notation:  
Set of spirals:  S1, S2,. . ., Sn
Set of capabilities:  k1, k2,. . .,      
Weights for capabilities corresponding to each spiral: 
1π , 2π ,…., nπ  where 0 ≤  tπ < 1 for t = 1, 2, …,n 






Capability of spiral S1 = ƒ(S1) =  k1  = 1π Κ 














:   : : : :  : 
                                            
20 Air Force. The AF Instruction 63-123 for Command and Control Systems in the Air Force. 
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Capability kt (0< kt<1) is a function of spiral St. kt is a weighted capability of 
the final capability Κ where the weight tπ  is 0 tπ≤ < 1. Since spiral development is an 
incremental approach, a set of spirals (which contains n spirals) is defined as Ѕ. 
Based on the essence of spiral development; the researcher believes n ≥ 3. Each 
spiral is a cumulative spiral in terms of its capability; this means the tth spiral has 
capability of spirals S1 through St-1. This aspect of the definition creates the 
dependency and, therefore, succession between spirals. Spiral St cannot be 
released until St-1 is completed. Thus, risks encountered during the execution of a 
current spiral can be examined and dealt with in future spirals. The properties of this 
model are as follows:  
Property 1: Successive spirals deliver increasing capabilities (i.e., capability 
of current spiral is greater than the capability of previous spiral).  
Explanation: By definition,  
ƒ(St) = ƒ(St-1) +  kt  for t = 2, .. n 
since kt > 0, ƒ(St) > ƒ(St-1) 
This property of the model maintains the increasing capabilities of all the 
spirals. It also illustrates that spirals are dependent on previous spirals in terms of 
their capabilities. Therefore, lessons learned from previous spirals can be passed on 
to the next spiral. 
In spiral developments, the end capability may not be known. And, therefore, 
delivery of the end capability is an abstract concept. However, DoD Program 
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 Managers have to deal in the real world. Therefore, we propose the following 
property.  
Property 2: If capabilities corresponding to each spiral add up to the final 











Explanation: ƒ(S1) =  k1  = 1π Κ 



















Since the last spiral delivers the final and, therefore, the total capability, 













It should be noted that due to the synergy of the spirals, for Property 2 the 
sum may be greater than one.  However, the result describes the flexibility of the 
spiral development. Choice of the weights 1π , 2π ,…., nπ provide the flexibility. = 
1 provides structure (instead of an abstract capability) to both the warfighter and the 









tπ are up to the discretion of the user and the Program Manager.  Based on the 
literature about Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development, researchers believe 
implicitly that the first spiral delivers 60-80% of the final capability. Therefore, this 
text proposes that 1π be greater than 0.5. This researcher recommends that each tπ  
have Property 3.  
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 Property 3: Weights of each tπ  forms a decreasing sequence given by 1π ≥ 
2π ≥….≥ nπ . 
Property 3 is recommended but not required. The order of each tπ  will help 
the warfighter. Since all the weights have to add up to 1, capabilities are front-
loaded. Larger capabilities are delivered first; then, they decrease in their capacity. 
However, the model ensures that delivered capabilities are in increasing order and 
occur at the same time the fraction of the remaining capability decreases. In terms of 








This is a model based on the researcher’s perspective of spiral development. 
It proposes a template of spirals {S1, S2,. . .,Sn} and their corresponding capabilities 
{k1, k2,. . .,kn} that are weighted { 1π , 2π ,…., nπ } of the final capability Κ. This 
structure, along with its properties, can help Program Managers define spiral 
development as it applies to their programs. The model maintains the “spirit” of spiral 
development by requiring that each successive spiral should deliver more capability 
than the previous spiral. Choice of weights in the model allows flexibility, and the 
structure assures the delivery of final capability by requiring that all the capabilities of 
individual spirals add up to the final capability. The recommendation of the added 
characteristic of each tπ  provides a map for possible values of the weights. 
It is necessary to note that the model does not present one aspect of the 
spiral—risk evaluation. The researcher believes that incorporating risk (using 
stochasticity) is an integral part of spiral; that incorporation will occur as spiral is 
implemented and data about probabilities becomes available. In the future, the 
researcher plans to expand the above model to describe spiral development as a set 
of threshold values that will provide guidance for Program Managers. It is also 
important to note that, this model being a high-level design of SD, all the intricacies 
and nuances have not been incorporated.  
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 2.4 Limitations of Spiral 
2.4.1 Lack of Understanding 
Spiral development, though a sound concept, has already acquired a 
reputation as “a mysterious process” in acquisition. Practitioners who defined it and 
have analyzed it understand it well. However, the definition itself (due to its flexible 
nature and deviation from traditional approaches) is not very clear. Hence, there 
exist various versions and perceptions of it. Implementation—or even the intent of 
implementation—has invoked responses from critics such as this New York Times 
editorial:  
The Faith-Based Missile Shield: This wisp of the old Star Wars fever dream is 
bedeviled by missing components and unproven premises. The Pentagon has 
suspended normal accountability standards in favor of what military 
proponents euphemistically term “evolutionary acquisition.” This means spend 
and build now, and attempt credible tests when and if all parts finally arrive.21  
Another editorial from the Times suggests that spiral development, which 
incorporates the latest technology due to its incremental process, satisfies the 
Navy’s hunger for impressive technology whether it is needed or not.22  Spiral 
development will be better understood the more it is discussed. As more studies 
focus on this new concept and as it is implemented, the ”promises and perils” of 
spiral will be clarified. The perceptions of Program Managers seem to be that it is the 
same old strategy but repackaged. This comment touches on the most important 
aspect of the limitations of spiral. It doesn’t matter how good the process is—if it is 
not user-friendly, it will not be implemented. In order to make spiral user-friendly, it is 
essential that spiral is well understood. 
                                            
21 ”The Faith-Based Missile Shield,” Editorial, The New York Times, 10 October 2004, A10. 
22 ”The Ship That’s Sinking the Navy,” Editorial, The New York Times, 23 April 2005, A12. 
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 2.4.2 Challenges in Implementation 
Success for spiral development implementation lies in the critical aspect of 
definition of requirements. The vital goal of providing rapidly developed smaller 
projects that are quickly fielded to the warfighter will only be achieved if clearly 
defined requirement statements are established ahead of time. The key requirement 
issues are identified in the following paragraphs. These issues are the challenges 
spiral development must address in order for the process to be deemed a success.  
The first requirement is that the successive rapid developments have to be 
independent of each other. This is a prerequisite for risk reduction. Though the 
projects that deliver these capabilities must be synergistic with the user, they also 
must satisfy separate criteria so Program Managers can allocate and evaluate risks 
across all aspects of the program. This independence is the key to controlling risks.  
The second requirement spiral development must address is that the user 
must be involved in the evolving baseline of the subsequent increments. The user’s 
contribution has two aspects. One is that the user should be an active participant in 
planning, controlling, and producing the program. The other is that the warfighter 
and Program Manager must trust each other. The knowledgeable persons in this 
area,23 those who have been in the thick of it, recognize that user feedback is crucial 
and a major prerequisite for the successful implementation of spiral development.  
Another pressure asserting itself on implementation is that the user 
community has to understand and agree with this concept of incremental capability. 
It is critical that the user be educated in terms of the evolutionary concept of spiral 
and its incremental introduction of capabilities. The user also must understand the 
concept of earlier fielding of systems without the final capability.  The user, then, 
must state upfront a willingness to initially field less-than-perfect systems. The user 
must understand that the first installment of capabilities will not be the final product, 
but will be a sizeable portion of it. Each warfighter has to believe that the Program 
                                            
23 Lorna Estep, Deputy Director, Supply Management, Air Force Material Command, interview by 
Aruna Apte, March 2005. 
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 Managers will deliver what has been agreed upon. Here “agreed upon” are the key 
words. Users must not compare the capability of the first spiral with the potential of 
the system it is expected to deliver. The main issue, then, is controlling user 
anticipation.  A spiral approach will not work if the user cannot accept less than 
100% of the final capability at the start. The group led by the user must agree on 
content of the spiral increments; then, it must structure the process so that the 
Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy can be supported by documents.  
The desired method of communication is analogous to a wheel with the 
Program Manager (PM) at the hub. All transfer of information is routed through the 
PM. Each stakeholder communicates his/her needs to the PM. The PM, being at the 
center of this network, manages performance, schedule and costs. Ideally, the PM 
should exercise leadership over teams formed for the execution of the project. 
Necessary interaction should not be restricted to warfighters and Program 
Managers. Communication between the warfighter, the program office in charge of 
managing the product, Pentagon staff supporting the program, and the contractor 
that ultimately builds the system is essential. Though routing communications 
through the PM on every occasion provides the PM with essential information for 
successful completion of the project and protects the project from escalating costs, 
increase in non-direct communication leads to longer cycle times. Delay in 
interaction increases the time pressure on the vendor for delivery of the spiral. This 
stress may lead to the vendor’s cutting corners in the quality of the product which 
may result in failure of process. Therefore, this author believes that though unusual 
and perhaps risky for cost control, the process of communication within this group of 
principal players is essential and needs to be time critical. The use of Integrated 
Product Teams is, therefore, a natural suggested response to this challenge.  It is 
necessary that there be formal, regularly scheduled meetings amongst all these 
players at the beginning of each spiral increment so that all parties involved agree 
upon the content, duration and requirements of the process ahead of time. As the 
program evolves, the requirement, content and, therefore, duration may change. 
Flexibility (which is the prominent aspect of spiral development) will allow these 
changes. But, with flexibility and freedom comes responsibility and accountability. 
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 Therefore, the group members must function as a team—they must communicate 
with and trust the other team-members; otherwise, the success of the spiral will be 
jeopardized. 
2.4.3 Logistic Complexity 
Spiral, due to its incremental nature, is also a logistical challenge. The fielded 
systems that are at different stages in the program will yield more than one 
configuration of the system. Multiple configurations are a logistic nightmare that 
leads to low operational availability. These instances already exist without the 
introduction of spiral. There are, currently, various causes for it. For instance, 
diminishing availability of manufacturing sources forces custom production—leading 
to escalating costs. If there are many such instances, production and distribution is a 
challenge. Technological improvements also lead to logistic delay. The Block 
approaches and P3I efforts are the usual suspects for the increase in the mean 
logistic delay time (MLDT); this increase, in turn, reduces the operational availability 
of the system.   
The reliability literature24 and the Military Handbook for Operational 
Reliability25 define Ao, operational availability, as the quotient of “up time” over “total 
time.” This equation is the performance measurement of a system. 
Equation 1. Performance Measurement of a System 
MLDTMTTRMTBF
MTBFAo ++=  
MTBF is the mean time between failures. MTTR is mean time to repair, which 
can be further explained as “time it takes to remove interference, remove, replace, 
and test the failed component, return the equipment to its original condition, and 
                                            
24 Benjamin S. Blanchard, Logistics Engineering and Management, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 2004. 
25 OPNAVINST, Operational Availability Handbook: A Practical Guide for Military System, Subsystem 
and Equipment. (300.12A). 
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 replace and retest any system interference removed to get to the failed equipment.”26 
MLDT, or mean logistic delay time, is the cumulative time required by all logistics 
processes to support the requisite repair.  
MTBF appears in the numerator as well as in the denominator. So, changes 
in MTBF do not affect Ao necessarily. Equation 1 also includes MTTR in the 
denominator. This variable is normally a small number, so it does not influence Ao as 
much as other factors. This leaves mean logistic delay time (MLDT) as the 
mathematical driver of Equation 1. MLDT includes Mean Supply Response Time 
(MSRT), Mean Administrative Delay Time (MADT) and Mean Outside Assistance 
Delay Time (MOADT).  MSRT (due to transportation, especially if there exists a high 
percentage of absent spare parts in the inventory or parts not easily accessible) and 
MOADT (due to lack of expertise of the users) usually have larger values. Therefore, 
to improve Ao, MSRT and MOADT (and, consequently, MLDT) should be improved. 
Multiple configurations lead to logistic complexity; this, in turn, increases all the 
factors associated with logistics.  Equation 1 illustrates that this leads to lower 
operational availability. 
The Block approach and P3 I both tend to follow the pattern described above. 
But the difference between these approaches and spiral is that spiral development 
expects different configurations. Therefore, spiral plans for them and manages them. 
Its flexibility and increments allow the capability to be fielded earlier without the 
expectation of a “finished” product; it also allows flexibility in the production and 
distribution. Logistic complexity, though an effect of spiral, can be dealt with by the 
very structure of spiral. This researcher also believes the management of logistics 
can be further facilitated by introducing modularization.  
 
                                            
26 Benjamin S. Blanchard, Logistics Engineering and Management, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 2004. 
20=
 III. Modularity in Spiral 
The increase in logistic complexity due to the incremental structure of spiral 
development is one inadequacy that can be addressed by introducing 
modularization in capabilities. Products whose performance can be improved by 
replacing a minimal set of components are termed “modular upgradeable.”  A spiral 
development approach enables the introduction of incremental capabilities delivered 
at a fast pace via a modular approach. Thus, sustenance of the resulting multiple 
configurations places demands on supporting the logistic systems. Various 
parts/products will be needed at different times. Normally, diversity of parts leads to 
high costs and costly logistics. These costs, however, can be mitigated by an 
adequately planned modular approach.  
It is important to note that spiral development, with its inherent characteristic 
of increments and flexibility, can manage logistic complexity better than the Block 
approach. It allows projection and forecast of needed parts/modules as each spiral is 
launched. Modularization has similar properties, increments and flexibility. 
Therefore, modularization may allow better management of production and 
distribution and, thereby, encourage reduction in logistic complexity.  So, whether 
spiral development is used for launching a new product or to improve an existing 
product, adding modularization to the process creates potential to reduce logistic 
complexity. However, it should be noted that with so many unique products and 
projects across Defense acquisition programs, modularization across the system 
may not be feasible.  
An advantage of modularization in the private sector is in managing rapid, 
sequential innovation and economies of scale.  This concept of combining product 
design to incorporate ever-improving technology may be imported to the DoD via 
spiral development with some modification. The interest in this research is in 
understanding if combining product design with logistics complexity and cost can 
help the DoD navigate the trajectory of rapid product improvement—satisfying 
warfighter needs and minimizing cost without constraining the Department’s degrees 
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 of freedom. Product design under existing DoD directives regarding spiral 
development has degrees of freedom, such as new features, new strategy, and new 
defense initiatives. In the private sector, there exist several different strategies by 
which the product can be made ”modular upgradeable" with different implications. 
In the private sector, Proprietary Modular Upgradeable (PMU) systems are 
systems in which customers must purchase both the improving and stable modules 
from the same firm. Such a firm is said to follow a PMU approach. For example, in 
cell phones, by making subsystems such as camera, battery, and storage 
upgradeable in modules, a firm can potentially address customer concerns about 
obsolesce. When the product is designed so the stable module is a commodity that 
can be purchased from the open market, the firm is said to follow a non-proprietary 
modular upgradeable (NPMU) approach. For example, personal computers are used 
for several generations of microprocessors with the same combination of industry-
standard non-proprietary peripherals. In other words, Microsoft products work with a 
variety of microprocessors. This author believes both the models for modular 
upgradeability could be applicable with spiral development. 
Combining modularization with spiral development has the following 
advantages.  Most importantly, the combination will reduce logistic complexity. In the 
private sector, modularization has achieved great results. By tailoring it to the DoD’s 
needs, similar results could be achieved. One of the advantages of the method in 
the private sector is that customers find it easier to make their purchase decisions 
when their initial investment is not completely lost by subsequent introduction of 
superior products. In the DoD, the acquisition programs represent the customer. 
Here, commitment to localizing performance improvements and modular 
development is more effective than integral architecture. In other words, amongst 
defense initiatives, open architecture is a “good thing.”  Modular designs are more 
conducive to a faster launch; therefore, from a warfighter’s view, modularity would 
definitely be a great advantage. Likewise, using standard components, a NPMU 
approach might be an attractive option when cost-side advantages are factored in. 
With logistics costs skyrocketing and the DoD beginning to run ships as private 
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 enterprises, this aspect of modularization is worth investigating. However, it should 
be noted that incentives for modularization and maintenance of proprietary control 
are dependent on the warfighters’ adoption of spiral development. It should also be 
noted that when direct or opportunity cost of modularization using the propriety 
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 IV. Examples of Spiral 
4.1 Past: Phalanx 
One situation from the past in which spiral development could have been of 
great benefit was Phalanx.27  The Phalanx Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) was 
built as a terminal defense against current and evolving anti-ship missiles and 
aircraft which penetrate outer fleet defensive envelopes. CIWS has evolved 
substantially since initial deployment. Since 1980, the original Block 0 has been 
improved multiple times. Changes include: Block 1 Baseline/L0 in 1988, Block 1 
Baseline/L1 in 1991, Block 1 Baseline/L2 in 1992, Block 1A in 1996, and Block 1B in 
1999.28  The CIWS overhaul program then began to accept Block 0 mounts and 
replace them with improved Block 1 systems. Prior to this, in the early nineties, the 
Naval Ordnance Station/Louisville (NOSL) began to perform a thorough Class A 
overhaul. Such an overhaul included a complete teardown, stripping, resurfacing, 
painting, and individual testing of the mounts. The reliability of the post-overhaul 
systems was as good as the benchmark of the Block 0 production systems and was 
greatly improved in comparison to the older systems. CIWS was upgraded as the 
requirements for such a weapon system evolved to meet emerging threats.   
Due to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, in 1995, the 
NOSL depot was scheduled for closure. Instead, it was purchased by the state of 
Kentucky and leased to the primary contractor for the CIWS overhaul program. The 
costs for overhauls escalated, while sponsor funding for the program became erratic. 
The funding issues and the soaring costs forced the Class A overhauls to be 
replaced by Class B overhauls. Class B overhauls were substantially reduced in 
                                            
27 Aruna Apte, “Optimizing Phalanx Weapon System Life-Cycle Support” (Acquisition Research 
Sponsored Report Series Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, October 2004), 1–33. 
28 PEOIWS, Phalanx Reliability Maintainability & Availability (RM&A) Handbook, 6th Revision. (March 
2004). 
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 scope compared to Class A overhauls. They were also not preset procedures, but 
were flexible to the observed condition of the mounts. 
The class B overhaul effort that started in 1999, and was in fleet use for three 
years, did not meet expectations in service reliability or cost. During the period of 
1998–2002, overall maintenance cost increased 53%.  From FY02 actual expense to 
the projected FY03 expenses, costs increased 28%. However, funding during these 
years did not conform to the needs of the system. Instead, the numbers were erratic: 
$47.26M in 1999, $21.76M in 2000, $46.17M in 2001. 
Obviously, a complex, mature, large, and diverse weapon system like CIWS 
has numerous interdependencies which are, by their very nature, difficult to analyze. 
The large population of the system magnifies the small increase in cost to large 
proportions across the system, and the diversity of the system (due to different 
baselines) creates unique logistic challenges. This, in turn, creates unique problems. 
Currently, CIWS has 158 ships, 308 mounts, and 6 baselines. The different 
baselines for all these mounts necessitate increased logistical complexity to provide 
necessary spares; this complexity, likewise, increases the lack of available 
maintenance expertise on the ship and places a heavy burden on inventory 
managers to carry the required spare parts. 
The diversification of CIWS baselines, which occurred over time, contributed 
to the high cost of maintenance. More baselines simply increase complexity. Several 
types of mounts need a wider variety of parts and people with different ship-board 
expertise. Logistics for a line of products that have a large variance is a complex 
state of affairs. Maintaining the inventory of and expertise for parts with diversity 
costs more. Some of this expansion is deliberate; yet, in some cases it is forced due 
to evolving security issues or strategy or both. In the case of CIWS, diversification 
occurred because of the system’s unique place in the weapon system and rapidly-
changing defense needs. But there is a lesson to be learned here: diverse baselines 
have high variable costs.  
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 On the other hand, existence of only one baseline invokes the economies of 
scale and brings costs down. A great example in the private-sector transportation 
industry is that of American Airlines and Southwest Airlines. American has 13 types 
of airplanes which increase the diversity of parts needed and, therefore, logistic 
complexity. Yet, Southwest has only one type of plane—increasing the efficiency of 
the company’s operations and making it economically successful. But, the defense 
industry does not have the luxury of single product lines; therefore, the DoD should 
examine spiral development, which can work economically without compromising 
operational availability. There is benefit in starting small and expanding in scope and 
scale gradually. Then, the process of spiral development—introducing a prototype or 
a small number of products and then gradually expanding the original product or 
enhancement through the fleet—would have the operational advantage of 
propagating the product line in two dimensions, scale and scope. Fixed cost will be 
generally low. Variable costs could be controlled by managing the increments of 
spiral development. 
4.2 Present: Global Hawk 
In the winter of 2001, the Global Hawk unmanned air system (which started 
as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program) entered 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD). The warfighter wanted 
something different than what ACTD had fielded. This two-staged development 
would have taken seven years and two configurations before the final capability 
desired by the warfighter was completed. Though the initial capability was basic, 
there were challenges in fielding the subsequent capabilities.  
Initially, this task was programmed as two spirals of length three and four 
years which, for all practical purposes, turned out to be Blocks. However, in the 
summer of 2001, the Global Hawk became a spiral development program. As 
explained in Figure 1, the added capabilities needed by the warfighter were 
programmed for production on a yearly basis. The user proposed the requirements 
up front, but agreed on flexible results to keep up with the changing environment. 
Thus, the incremental capabilities were flexible—spirals in a true sense. There was 
27=
 better communication between the parties concerned; therefore, the risk factor was 
reduced. Between the rapid sequential deliveries of the spirals, the warfighter was 
allowed to add or remove the upcoming requirements. For each spiral, review and 
risk analysis were performed to ensure that the program was on track. 
Figure 1. Draft Example of a Global Hawk Spiral Development 
 
Source: Jeffrey Wieringa, Rear Adm. (Sel), “Spiral development and the F/A-18,” Program Manager 
May-June 2003 50 - 53  
4.3 Future: Littoral Combat Ship 
Torpedo-firing submarines, an array of new and old mines, swarming small, 
fast, missile-firing boats—all form a real, relatively cheap, formidable, rapidly 
growing and collective global threat to the US Navy. Part of the Navy’s answer to 
these threats is in two recently introduced bold and new concepts: the family of 
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and a shipbuilding concept that will deliver ships faster 
and with designs adaptable to new technology. The critics of these concepts claim 
that LCS will not function as planned; the system is too small; costs will be very high, 
and technologies are not mature enough to justify the effort. Yet, there is more at 
stake here than just the characteristics of LCS. The Navy needs to regain control of 
its shipbuilding program.  In the past, shipbuilding budgets have been unstable, 
unrealistic, and unpredictable. The traditional way the Navy designs and builds ships 
is deliberate, risk-intolerant and challenging for future upgrades. This conservative 
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 approach inhibits rapid insertion of new technology essential in critical mission 
areas. Adding upgrades later through major overhaul/upgrade programs based on 
past records tend to be very costly—particularly when viewed from the perspective 
of remaining hull life.  
The process of spiral development, if applied to certain aspects of LCS’s 
design and acquisition, will help the Navy build ships faster and in increments—first 
delivering a basic capability, and, subsequently, including improvements based on 
testing and advanced technology. It is said that the LCS in this century is what the 
aircraft carrier was to the Navy in the last century. Spiral development offers the 
Navy a potential alternative to correct costly shipbuilding paradigms. 
The spiral development approach has much potential for containing traditional 
shipbuilding costs. LCS, brought to the Fleet via spiral development, could be a 
catalyst in enabling rapid, sequential innovation applied to more ships at sea at a 
faster rate. Current DoD initiatives that encourage “rewriting the rules as you go” 
offer the Navy this opportunity. LCS is a sound concept that is innovative, cost 
effective, and introduces capabilities as needed.  But, more importantly, it provides 
the Evolutionary Acquisition model necessary for the Navy to bring ship-building in 
line with modern business practices. It also aggressively addresses one major issue 
for many surface-combatant modernization plans—bringing modern technologies 
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 V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This research has studied the process of spiral development as one part of 
Evolutionary Acquisition and has offered a perspective on that approach. It has 
provided the definition of spiral development, motivation behind it and a survey of 
various articles written about it. In addition, it has described the process of spiral 
development by comparing it with the traditional Block approach. It analyzed the 
process of spiral development by formulating a mathematical model that will serve 
as a template for Program Managers. This is one of the researcher’s major 
contributions to the current studies of spiral development. A research study 
validating this model will be of great benefit to Acquisition Research. The researcher 
is currently working on the outline of such a study. In this study, interviews with 
Program Managers who could have used spiral, who may be in the process of 
implementing it, or are planning to do so in the near future will be reviewed.  
This discussion has also listed the challenges of spiral development, such as: 
lack of insight on the process itself, the requirements necessary for the success of 
spiral, and, most importantly, logistic complexity instigated by spiral. The first will 
diminish as more literature about spiral is produced and becomes available. As more 
programs use spiral development, the acquisition community will become better 
acquainted with the fundamentals of the process. The same can be said about 
requirements of spiral; more exposure will teach both warfighters and Program 
Mangers to articulate and communicate each system’s requirements. Logistic 
complexity can be somewhat reduced using modularization. Yet, this hypothesis 
needs further testing, and more research in that area needs to be conducted.  
The notion of introducing modularization in spiral development is also an 
important contribution of this research. Modularization is a concept and practice 
frequently used in the private sector that is worth investigating for possible adoption 
into the evolving process of spiral development. In the immediate future, this 
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 researcher plans to extend the basic model of spiral development by further 
incorporating modularization.  
The implementation of spiral (past, present, and future) has been mentioned 
in this article. The success story of Global Hawk has been described. Yet, a case 
study or a research project that chronicles a step-by-step implementation of spiral 
would be valuable. The scope of this research project did not include the cost factor 
of the spiral process, but this aspect of spiral must be addressed in the near future; 
the researcher has planned a case study to that effect.    
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